Experiments motivated by Bell's theorem suggest that information is sometimes transferred over spacelike intervals, and claims have been made that the results of these experiments do have this implication. However, the theoretical basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell's Theorem, which shows only that if certain predictions of quantum theory are correct, and certain hidden-variables assumptions about the nature of physical reality are valid, then information must be transferred over spacelike intervals. The experimental results do conform closely to the predictions of quantum theory in these cases, but the most natural conclusion to draw is not that information is transferred over spacelike intervals, but rather that the hidden-variable assumption is not valid. For the existence of such hidden variables would directly contradict the precepts of quantum philosophy. To reach the more profound conclusion that information is sometimes transferred over spacelike intervals one would need a much stronger theorem, one that would be based on, and preserve, the orthodox precepts of quantum theory, rather than contradicting them. A theorem is of this kind *
is proved in this paper. Orthodox assumptions lead to a very limited class of true counterfactual statements. A rigorous logical framework for reasoning with counterfactual statements within the framework provided by the quantum precepts is then constructed, and the proof is carried through within that framework.
Introduction.
A great deal of experimental activity continues to occur on the question of quantum nonlocality. A recent issue of Physics Today [1] has a bulletin entitled "Nonlocality Get More Real". It reports experiments at three laboratories (Geneva [2] , Innsbruck [3] , and Los Alamos [4] ) directed at closing loopholes in proofs that, under certain conditions, information about which experiments are performed in one region has effects in a second experimental region that is spacelike separated from the first.
In the experiment reported in the first of these papers [2] the distance between the two experimental regions is more than 10km, and the paper begins with the dramatic statement "Quantum theory is nonlocal." The longer version [5] says "Today, most physicists are convinced that a future loophole-free test will definitely demonstrate that nature is indeed nonlocal."
The question thus arises: Could experiments of this general kind that confirm the predictions of orthodox quantum theory ever provide evidence for a breakdown of the orthodox basic locality property of quantum theory?
The answer is "No". But then what are the physicists at these laboratories doing?
The answer is this: They are considering a locality property that is related to the orthodox one, but is not identical to it. But what motivates this deviation from orthodoxy?
To understand the motivation one should recall first the orthodox locality property. It follows directly from basic principles of quantum theory. Letting S represent the quantum state (density matrix) these basic principles are:
The Reduction Formula:
S −→ [P SP + (1 − P )S(1 − P )] −→ [P SP or (1 − P )S(1 − P )].
The Probability Formula:
< P >= Trace P S/ Trace S.
The Microcausality Condition:
[Q 1 (x 1 ), Q 2 (x 2 )] = 0 for (x 1 − x 2 ) 2 < 0.
The first line of the first formula specifies the reduction of the state S associated with the answering (by nature) of the question associated with the projection operator P , provided that answer is not known, and the second line describes the reduction when the answer is known.
The second formula is the prediction of quantum theory for the average value of the function that has value unity or zero according to whether or not the answer to the question associated with the projection operator P is 'Yes'.
The third line asserts that the operators associated with observables measured in two space-like-separated regions commute.
If two projection operators P 1 and P 2 correspond to observables measured in two spacelike-separated regions then these principles entail (using the normalization Trace S = 1 and the defining property of projection operators,
This gives the orthodox locality property:
"The fraction of answers 'Yes' predicted by quantum theory for the outcome of a measurement performed in one spacetime region is independent of which experiment, if any, is performed in a spacetime region that is space-likeseparated from the first region."
Each prediction of quantum theory is fundamentally a prediction of the observed average value of a function that is either unity or zero depending on whether some particular outcome appears or not. But the fact that such an average value does not depend upon which experiment is performed in a faraway region does not entail that the individual outcomes do not depend upon which experiment is performed faraway: the individual outcomes in one region could be highly dependent upon which experiment is performed far away without affecting the measured average value.
Yet in spite of the muteness of quantum theory on this matter of the individual outcomes, it would nevertheless be strange, and contrary to the spirit of the theory of relativity, for the average values measured in one region to be independent of which experiment is freely chosen and performed in a spacelike separated regions if the individual results violate this property.
The "local hidden-variable assumption" of the Bell's original theorem [6] contains the assumption that the individual outcomes do satisfy the same independence property that the average values satisfy. This assumption might seem innocuous, but it introduces an element of "counterfactuality" that is quite contrary to quantum philosophy: it entails that nature is consistent with the possibility that the outcomes of measurements can be defined for both the actually performed measurements, and also for the unperformed ones as well.
Bell [7] later introduced a seemingly weaker hidden-variable assumption, but it can be shown [8, 9] that this later form entails the original one, apart from errors that tend to zero as the number of experiments tends to infinity. So there is in principle no significant difference between the two hiddenvariable assumptions, in the sense that both contradict the basic quantum precept that one cannot in general assign outcomes to both the performed and unperformed measurements. Thus, from the orthodox point of view, the hidden-variable assumption is far more likely to fail than the relativistic ban on faster-than-light action.
It is, however, possible to prove a much stronger theorem, one that builds directly upon the orthodox precepts of quantum theory themselves, and preserves them. The proof is rigorous. Like all theorems of this general kind it is based essentially on the use of counterfactuals. Yet there is a strong principle in quantum theory that forbids the unrestricted use of counterfactual notions. So the key step in the proof is the deduction, starting from orthodox principles, of the truth of certain counterfactual statements. This is achieved by combining two ideas of orthodox quantum theory. The first is the notion that experimenters can be considered free to choose which experiments they will perform. The second is the notion that an experimental outcome that has been witnessed by someone can be considered to be fixed and settled, independently of which experiment some other faraway experimenter will freely choose to perform at a later time, as measured in some specified Lorentz frame.
Formulation of the Locality Condition LOC1.
The proof is based on a causality condition called LOC1. It expresses the idea that if an experiment is performed and the outcome is recorded prior to some time T , as measured in some specified Lorentz frame, then this outcome can be regarded as fixed and settled, independently of which experiment may be freely chosen and performed (faraway) at a time later than T .
This putative condition is a theoretical idea, and it depends on another theoretical idea, namely the notion that experimenters can be considered free to choose between the alternative possible experiments that are available to them. Bohr himself often stressed that the choices made by experimenters should be considered free: the whole idea of complementarity is that the single quantum state represents, simultaneously, the pertinent information concerning all of these alternative possibilities. In his debate with Einstein he never tried to duck the issues by claiming that one simply could not even contemplate or discuss these alternative possibilities, only one of which could actually be realized. By simply refusing even to contemplate the alternative possible experimental choices Bohr could have protected quantum theory from challenges pertaining to possible nonlocal influences, but only at the expense of a theoretical closed mindedness that he did not embrace. In fact, the concept of "possible worlds", only one of which is "actual", and the idea that we can act to influence which of the possible worlds will become actual, is the foundation of our practical dealings with the world, and is the whole practical purpose of doing science: Bohr tried to make in his philosophy concordant with common sense scientific practice.
The first main point is that the combination of the notions of "free choice"
and "no backward-in-time influence on outcomes that have already been observed by someone" entail the truth of certain 'counterfactual' statements. If the presently observed outcome O1 is independent of what some faraway experimenter will freely choose to do "later", and he actually chooses to do experiment E1, and not the alternative possibility E2, then one can say that the presently observed outcome O1 "would occur" now even if E2 were to be chosen later, instead of E1. This is a theoretical condition: it is not logically necessary. But it comes naturally out of orthodox quantum thinking. This condition, with "later" defined in one specified frame, leads to no logical contradiction, and is far weaker than a blanket assumption of the existence of the sort of hidden variables ordinarily assumed in Bell's theorem.
In order to proceed in a rigorous fashion it is necessary to bring in formally the notion of "possible worlds", and the meanings of a few rudimentary terms.
Suppose one is considering a specified set of alternative possible experimental arrangements generated by the free choices made by a set of experimenters. Each of the alternative possible experimental arrangements is assumed to be specified by a set of local macroscopic conditions -one for each experimenter -localized in a corresponding spacetime region. And each of the possible outcomes of such an extended (global) experiment is supposed to be specified by a set of local macroscopic conditions, one located in each of the experimental regions. If there were N E experimenters in N E different regions, and each experimenter could choose between N M local measurements, and each of these measurements could have N O possible outcomes, then the total number of logically possible worlds under consideration is (N M × N O ) N E . Each of the finite set of elementary statements that enter into the characterization of these various worlds is associated with a macroscopic spacetime region, and with one bit of information that is associated with some possible macroscopic event in that region. The physically possible worlds are a subset of the logically possible worlds: the physically possible worlds include only those that, according to the predictions of quantum theory, and the other laws of nature, have a non-null probability to appear. The physically possible worlds are called "possible worlds." Normally, I omit also the word "possible": unless otherwise stated a "world" will mean a "physically possible world".
The rudimentary logical relationships involve the terms "and", "or", "equal" and "negation". A statement S involving these relations is said to be true at (or in) world W if and only if S is true by virtue of the set of truths that define W, and the laws of nature.
One further rudimentary relationship is the so-called "material conditional", which is represented here by the single arrow →: the statement
This rudimentary relationship is different from the logical relationship called the "strict conditional", which is represented here by the word "implies". The statement " 'A is true' implies 'B is true' " is sometimes shortened to "A implies B", and is represented symbolically here by A ⇒ B. By definition, A ⇒ B is true if and only if for every (physically possible) world W either "A is false at W" or "B is true at W": i.e., for every (physically possible) world W, the rudimentary statement A → B is true at W.
The logical structure being used here can be expressed in terms of sets: Let {W : X} represent the set of worlds W such that the rudimentary statement X is true at W . The symbol {X} is an abbreviation of {W : X}. Thus the statement that A ⇒ B is true is equivalent to the statement that {A} ⊂ {B}: ['The set of W at which A is true' is a subset of the set of W at which B is true.] It is also equivalent to the statement: {A} ∩ {¬B} = ∅: [The intersection of the set of W at which A is true with the set of W at which B is false is the empty set.]
It follows from these definitions (see Appendix) that But suppose A is the negation of B: A = ¬B. Then the statement (2.2) is, by virtue of the identity (2.1), and the falseness of "¬B ∧ B", true for any C: the statement (2.2) would be true, but could have no empirical content. The same lack of content would obtain if A = (¬B ∧ D). Consider, then, the following analogous statement:
"If experiment R2 is performed in region R and experiment L2 is performed in (the spacelike separated) region L and outcome L2+ appears in L, then if R1 is performed in R the outcome in L would be L2+."
Suppose R1 and R2 are mutually exclusive experiments [i.e., "R2 is performed" implies that it is false that "R1 is performed", and vice versa].
Then the above statement is trivially true for any value of the final symbol L2+. Consequently, this statement cannot be a valid expression of any locality property.
The locality condition LOC1 is introduced into the logical framework by employing a third kind of implication, one that uses the phrase and concept "instead of". This concept is of central importance in orthodox counterfactual reasoning, and I shall give it a precise and appropriate meaning within a strictly quantum context. Suppose that A represents some possible conditions that the experimenters could set up, and some conditions on the possible outcomes. And suppose that C represents some alternative possible experiment that could have been set up, and that D represents some possible outcome of the alternative set up. Then consider a statement of the form: "A implies that if, instead, C then D,"
(2.
3)
The premise of the final conclusion D is that C holds instead of A, not in addition to A. This introduction of the idea "instead of" allows one to avoid the logical contradiction that arose before. However, the exact meaning of statements of this form must be specified. It must be specified in a way that does not contradict any precept of quantum theory, and whose truth is ensured, under certain conditions, by orthodox precepts of quantum theory. The phrase "If, instead, C then D" is traditionally represented symbolically by [C2 → D]. I shall use that symbolic form for the quantum version defined here. Like many other statements in the logic it is a statement that is made in one world, say W . But it is a statement about about an entire set of possible world W ′ that is related to world W in some way, but in which condition condition C holds instead of any condition in world W that is explicitly contradicted by condition C. The condition C in such a statement will always be a condition that is controlled by a free choice: it will be an assertion that, in some one of the specified experimental spacetime regions, some one of the specified alternative possible mutually exclusive experiments associated with that region is chosen and performed.
By definition, the assertion that [C2 → D] is true in world W is equivalent to the assertion that D is true in every possible world W ′ that differs from W only by possible effects of imposing condition C rather than whatever condition in world W is directly contradicted by condition C.
Given this definition of [C2 → D] the statement
expresses the condition that if W is a world in which A is true then D must be true in every possible world W ′ that differs from W only by possible effects of choosing condition C, instead of whatever was chosen in its place in W . Notice that this definition allows this statement to be combined with other logical statements in a natural way. Suppose, or example, that one has, an addition to the truth of (2.4), the truth of B ⇒ A, which asserts, for all W , that if B is true in W then A is true in W . Then one can immediately conclude from the meaning of (2.4) that
(2.5)
The definition of [C 2 → D] is general. But in order to make use of it one must have some strict condition on the "possible effects of choosing condition C instead of whatever condition in world W is directly contradicted by condition C."
This where LOC1 can be used. Suppose T (C) is defined to be the latest time (as measured in the specified frame) that is earlier than the earliest time in the spacetime region in which condition C is chosen and performed. Then LOC1 asserts that imposing condition C has no possible effect on outcomes that occur earlier than T (C). But in this case if D specifies an outcome in the region earlier than T (C) then LOC1 ensures that [C2 → D] will be true in all worlds W such that D is true in W . Thus we have deduced
if the condition E asserts that D occurs. Thus the physical idea of LOC1 is properly expressed in this logical language, which is similar to the logical language that logicians have used in order to deal in a rigorous way with counterfactual statements. But the present treatment is specifically tailored to quantum theory, as defined by orthodox precepts.
Another application of the formalism is this. Suppose that (2.5) is true. And suppose that F is a condition on the outcome under the alternative condition C, and that D ⇒ F . This is the condition that, for every W ′ , if D is true in W ′ then F is true in W ′ . Then the meaning of (2.5), as described above (2.4) , with B in place of A, ensures that the following statement is true:
This result is used to get line 4 of the proof given below. All the other lines of the proof given in the next section can be strictly deduced, in a similar way, from just the logical rules, the predictions of quantum theory, and the property LOC1. (See Appendix for details.) The one exception is line 6, which is just line 5 with L2 replaced by L1. Lines 7 through 14 show that, within this logical framework, which embodies nothing but the definitions of the logical terms, the predictions of quantum theory, and LOC1, line 6 leads to a contradiction, and therefore is false.
3. Proof that a certain statement is true and another is false.
The argument is based on a Hardy-type [10] experimental set-up. This set-up defines the universe of statements under consideration here.
There are two experimental regions R and L, which are spacelike separated. In region R there are two alternative possible measurements, R1 and R2. In region L there are two alternative possible measurements, L1 and L2. Each local experiment has two alternative possible outcomes, labelled by + and -. The symbol R1 appearing in a logical statement stands for the statement "Experiment R1 is chosen and performed in region R." The symbol R1+ stands for the statement that "The outcome '+' of experiment R1 appears in region R." Analogous statements with other variables have the analogous meanings.
There are, in the Hardy-type experimental set up, four pertinent predictions of quantum theory. They are expressed by the four logical statements:
The symbol ¬ in front of the square brackets in (3.4) means that the statement in the square brackets is false. The detectors are assumed to be 100% efficient, so that for each possible world some outcome, either + or −, will, according to quantum mechanics, appear in each of the two regions.
Each line of the following proof is a strict consequence of these predictions of quantum mechanics, combined with the property LOC1 and the properties of the rudimentary logical symbols. Line 6 is the one exception: it is just the same as line 5, but with L2 replaced by L1. The part of the proof from line 7 to line 14 shows that the statement on line 6 is false. Thus the proof shows that orthodox ideas lead to the conclusion that line 5 is true, but that line
Conclusions
It is possible to introduce into quantum theory, without generating any contradictions, the causality notion that what has already been measured and recorded at times prior to a time T, as measured in some specified Lorentz frame, does not depend upon which experiments will be freely chosen and performed later. This notion of causal evolution forward in time does not contradict the precepts of orthodox quantum theory, and is probably a part of the thinking of most orthodox quantum physicists. But this causality idea automatically entails the truth of a limited class of counterfactual statements. This class is very small compared to the set of conterfactual assertions entailed by the assumptions of Bell's theorem [6] . However, this limited idea of causation does lead, in the context of Hardy-type experiments, to an important condition: line 5 of the above proof must be true, whereas line 6 must be false. These two contrasting statements are proved without introducing hidden variables, or the strong conditions that they entail about the existence of outcomes of unperformed measurements.
What has been proved is that if L2 is freely chosen and performed at the earlier time t then a certain statement SR is true, whereas if L1 is freely chosen and performed at the earlier time then SR is false. Here SR is the statement:
SR: If experiment R2 is freely chosen and performed in region R and outcome + appears in R, then if, instead, R1 had been freely chosen and performed in region R the outcome in R would necessarily have been −.
There is no logical problem with the fact that truth of SR depends upon the free choice made in the earlier region L: effects are supposed to occur after their causes. But the nontrivial dependence of SR upon the free choice made in L would appear to be a problem for any model in which the information about the free choice made in region L cannot be present in the spacelike separated region R.
To see the problem consider the orthodox idea that "nature chooses" a particular outcome in region R just at the moment of the occurrence (or observation) of the outcome in R of which ever measurement is performed there. In this model what nature would choose in the unrealized case R1 is fixed by theoretical requirements to be always R1− in the case L2 is chosen in the spacelike situated region L, but to be sometimes R1+ in case L1 is chosen in L. But how can these two disparate theoretical demands be maintained if the information about the free choice made in L is not available in R. The fact that a theoretically necessary connection between possible outcomes in R must depend upon which free choice is made by the experimenter in L appears to be irreconcilable with any model that enforces the idea that the information about the free choice in L cannot get to R. In any case, the need to accomodate these two disparate theoretical demands places a strong condition on any model of reality, whether that model be a hidden-variabletype model or not.
It might be contended that the conclusion that information must be transferred over a spacelike interval is, itself, contrary to the basic precepts of relativistic quantum field theory. That position cannot be rationally maintained. A complete quantum theory must make predictions about connections between observations, and hence must eventually deal with the way that information about outcomes of measurements affects predictions about other experiments. One can, of course, deal just with the formulas for predictions, with no attempt to understand what is happening. But that approach makes no statement one way or the other about whether information actually needs to be transferred over spacelike intervals. If one wants to look deeper then one can turn to the Tomonaga-Schwinger [13, 14] formulation of relativistic quantum field theory in terms of space-like surfaces. These surfaces are a relativistic generalization of the constant-time surfaces of non-relativistic quantum theory, and the reduction of the state associated with an observed outcome occurs along the specified spacelike surface. One finds that all connections between observations are Lorentz invariant, as is required for a relativistic theory, and that, moreover, these predictions are independent of which Lorentz frame LF is used to specify that the surfaces sigma are, say, just the constant-time surfaces in LF. But no matter which frame is chosen as LF there will be, in connection with the information introduced by spec-ifying the outcome of certain measurements, some information transferred over spacelike intervals in this orthodox relativistically invariant quantum field theory. The result proved here suggests, by means of a general argument that does not depend on a detailed model of relativistic quantum field theory, such as the Tomonaga-Schwinger formulation, that the existence of such transfers is a necessary feature of relativistic quantum field theory.
APPENDIX: Proofs of various statements.
For any statement S expressed in terms of the rudimentary logical connections let {W : S} be the set of all (physically possible) worlds W such that statement S is true at W (i.e., S is true in world W). Sometimes {W : S} will be shortened to {S}.
A main set-theoretic definition is this: Suppose 
Proof of line 5
Line 4 has the condition L2 appearing to the right of the counterfactual condition R1. The counterfactual condition R1 changes R2 to R1, but leaves L2 unchanged. Hence the L2 appearing on the right can be omitted, since it appears already on the left. But then application of (2.1) gives the line 5.
Proof of line 12
Statement (3.4), expressed in the set-theoretic form, says there is some world in {L1 ∧ R1} ∩ {L1−} that is not in {R2−}. This entails that, in {L1 ∧ R1}, there some world in {L1−} that is not in {R2−}. This is the form of (3.4) given in line 12.
Proof of line 14
In line 14 the world W can be any world in which L1 and R2 hold. And W ′ can be any world that differs from W only by possible effects of changing R2 to R1. But no matter what these possible changes are, the world W ′ must be a world in which L1 and R1 hold, and in any such world the statement (L1− → R1 ∧ R1−) is false, by virtue of line 13. Thus line 14 is true.
